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Elastic contests and the robustness
of the all-pay auction
Abstract. This paper studies a large class of imperfectly discriminating
contests, referred to as elastic contests, that induce players to either overbid
a standing bid or to abstain from bidding altogether. Many common forms of
contest are elastic. In any equilibrium of an elastic contest, there is complete
rent dissipation for all but at most one player. This result is used to show
that in any sufficiently decisive anonymous standard contest, any equilibrium
is an all-pay auction equilibrium. Thus, the analysis offers strong support
for the robustness of the all-pay auction. The approach also delivers definite
answers regarding the extent of rent dissipation in Tullock contests with
intermediate values of the decisiveness parameter.
Keywords. Contests, all-pay auction; rent-seeking, mixed Nash equilib-
rium, rent dissipation.
JEL-Codes. C72 - Noncooperative Games; D45 - Rationing; Licensing;
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures,
and Voting Behavior; L12 - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies.
1. Introduction
One of the principal concerns of contest theory has been the determination of
“wasteful” rent dissipation in general situations of rivalry.1 Such rivalry has
often been modeled in terms of the (first-price) all-pay auction, in which the
highest bid wins with certainty.2 Using the all-pay auction and its variants
is convenient in particular because the corresponding equilibrium is well-
understood through contributions by Hillman and Samet (1987), Hillman
and Riley (1989), Baye et al. (1996), and Siegel (2009, 2010). However, as-
suming an entirely deterministic relationship between bids and allocation is
restrictive in some applications. For example, in a sporting contest, not only
the quality of the field and contributed effort, but also the uncertainty of
outcome matters (Szymanski, 2003). It is, therefore, desirable to charac-
terize the equilibrium also in contests that are not perfectly discriminating.
Complete results in this area, however, have been difficult to obtain.3
1For example, in a patent race (cf. Loury, 1979; Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980), sunk
and irreversible research investments determine which firm is more likely to be the first in
the market. For an introduction to contest theory, see Konrad (2007).
2See, e.g., applications to areas such as sales promotion (Varian, 1980; Narasimhan,
1988), interbank competition (Broecker, 1990), monopoly (Ellingsen, 1991), market mi-
crostructure (Dennert, 1993), political lobbying (Baye et al. 1993; Che and Gale, 1998),
and contests for status (Moldovanu et al., 2007).
3For illustration, consider Tullock’s (1980) rent-seeking game. Two players i and j
produce lottery tickets for a prize of value v > 0. For respective investment levels xi ≥ 0
and xj ≥ 0, player i’s payoff is given by
Πi(xi, xj) = pi(xi, xj)v − xi, (1)
where
pi(xi, xj) =
{
xRi
xRi +x
R
j
if xRi + x
R
j > 0
1
2 if x
R
i + x
R
j = 0
(2)
denotes player i’s probability of winning, and R > 0 is the decisiveness parameter. For
values of R ≤ 2, the equilibrium can be found by an analysis of the players’ first-order
conditions (see, e.g., Pe´rez-Castrillo and Verdier, 1992). On the other hand, in the limit
case R = ∞, the game corresponds to the all-pay auction. For intermediate values of R,
i.e., for 2 < R <∞, the rent-seeking game has proven to be much less tractable.
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Three notable contributions have made progress on this issue. Baye et al.
(1994) have pointed out that, in the symmetric two-player Tullock contest
with intermediate values of the decisiveness parameter, a mixed equilibrium
with complete rent dissipation can be found as the limit of equilibria in finite
games. Extending these results, Alcade and Dahm (2010) have identified a
wide class of contests that allow an all-pay auction equilibrium, i.e., an equi-
librium in which players’ respective probabilities of participation, expected
bids, ex-ante winning probabilities, and expected payoffs are all the same as
in the equilibrium of the corresponding all-pay auction. Using a different
approach, Che and Gale (2000) have characterized equilibria for difference-
form contests with a uniform distribution of the noise term. These equilibria
capture a preemption effect, in the sense that an increased asymmetry in val-
uations weakly reduces the extent of rent dissipation. Overall, however, less
seems to be known about the possibility of equilibria with other properties.4
The present paper proposes a new approach to characterizing the equilib-
rium set of a large class of imperfectly discriminating contests. The approach
exploits the fact that in many commonly used specifications of contests, there
is a simple relationship between marginal and total payoffs for low-bidding
players. Since players in contests can always ensure themselves a nonnegative
payoff by remaining purely passive, this relationship allows to formulate con-
ditions, collected in the definition of an elastic contest, under which a bidder
either strictly overbids any standing bid or abstains from bidding altogether.
4This point may be important, though. For example, alternative equilibria promising
higher rents for some or all of the players might be more likely to be coordinated upon.
Also, knowing the entire equilibrium set is relevant for the comparative statics of the
model.
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Then, given the strong incentive to overbid, any given positive bid can be
rationalized only if the equilibrium belief assigns some probability weight to
strictly smaller bids. As a consequence, any equilibrium in an elastic contest
involves either arbitrarily small positive bids or non-participation, which has
strong implications for players’ equilibrium rents.
The following results are obtained. First, it is shown that generally in
elastic contests, all rents are competed away in any equilibrium for all but
at most one player. In particular, in a symmetric elastic contest, all rents
are entirely dissipated in any symmetric equilibrium. Further, there is at
most one active player in any pure-strategy equilibrium of an elastic contest.
Quite specific results can be obtained when the elastic contest is standard
and anonymous.5 Between two players, any equilibrium in such a contest is
an all-pay auction equilibrium. This result extends to the case of three or
more players when the contest is, in addition, sufficiently decisive. Together,
these findings shed light on the robustness of the equilibrium prediction ob-
tained for the all-pay auction. The analysis also yields some definite answers
regarding the extent of rent dissipation in the popular Tullock contest.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the set-
up. Section 3 illustrates the approach of the paper using the Tullock game.
The formal notion of an elastic contest is introduced in Section 4. Examples
are given in Section 5. Section 6 contains the equilibrium analysis in the
general case. The robustness of the all-pay auction is discussed in Section 7.
Section 8 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
5In a standard contest, payoffs are additively separable, players’ valuations are constant,
and costs are linear. In an anonymous contest, winning probabilities depend only on
efforts, and not on the players’ names. See Section 7.
4
2. Set-up
This section introduces the class of games with continuous strategies and
normalized payoffs, which serves as the basic framework for the subsequent
analysis. Assumptions made in this section will be used tacitly throughout
the paper.
There are N ≥ 2 players. Each player i = 1, ..., N chooses a bid xi ≥ 0.
Bids will alternatively be referred to as either effort levels or investments.
Decisions are made simultaneously and independently. Player i’s payoff is
denoted by Πi(xi, x−i), where x−i = (x1, ..., xi−1, xi+1, ..., xN).6 For nota-
tional convenience, payoffs are assumed to be normalized, i.e., Πi(0, x−i) = 0
for any x−i 6= 0. Many commonly used classes of contests possess normalized
payoffs (cf. Section 5). In general, any given payoff function Π̂i(xi, x−i) can
be normalized by redefining payoffs as Πi(xi, x−i) = Π̂i(xi, x−i)− Π̂i(0, x−i).
Thus, normalized payoffs can be assumed without loss of generality. For tech-
nical convenience, it is assumed that there exists, for any i = 1, ..., N , some
bid level xmaxi > 0 such that Πi(xi, x−i) < 0 for any xi > x
max
i and for any
x−i ∈ X−i.7 It will also be assumed that Πi(xi, x−i) is bounded from above,
and continuously differentiable at any (xi, x−i) 6= 0, for any i = 1, ..., N .
The definition of a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies follows Dasgupta
and Maskin (1986). Since, by assumption, the effective choice set of player
i corresponds to the bounded interval Xi = [0, x
max
i ], a mixed strategy for
player i may be defined as a probability distribution µi on the Borel sets of
Xi. Let D(Xi) denote the set of mixed strategies for player i. Then a mixed
6Also the notation x−i,j = (x1, ..., xi−1, xi+1, ..., xj−1, xj+1, ..., xN ) will be used. For
example, Πi(xi, x−i) = Πi(xi, xj , x−i,j), etc.
7E.g., in the earlier example, it would suffice to choose xmaxi = v.
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equilibrium is a tuple (µ∗1, ..., µ
∗
N), representing a probability distribution µ
∗
i ∈
D(Xi) for each player i = 1, ..., N , such that ex-ante expected payoffs are
maximized by each player i, i.e., such that
Π∗i ≡
∫
Πi(xi, x−i)d(µ∗i (xi)× µ∗−i(x−i)) (3)
= max
µi∈D(Xi)
∫
Πi(xi, x−i)d(µi(xi)× µ∗−i(x−i)), (4)
where µ∗−i(x−i) =
∏
j 6=iµ
∗
j(xj). A mixed equilibrium (µ
∗
1, ..., µ
∗
N) is called
symmetric if µ∗1 = ... = µ
∗
N . Since payoffs are normalized, player i’s expected
equilibrium payoff Π∗i will be referred to also as player i’s equilibrium rent.
8
For a mixed strategy µi ∈ D(Xi), let S(µi) denote the support set of
µi. Since Xi is a bounded and closed subset of R+, so is S(µi). Write
xi = minS(µi) for player i’s lowest bid, and x¯i = maxS(µi) for player i’s
highest bid. Player i is said to use arbitrarily small bids if xi = 0. By
definition, µi({0}) is player i’s probability of bidding zero, i.e., player i’s
probability of non-participation. Player i will be called purely passive if
µi({0}) = 1, active if µi({0}) < 1, and always active if µi({0}) = 0. If player
i is active, then x+i = inf S(µi)\{0} denotes the infimum of all positive bids
used by player i. Player i uses arbitrarily small positive bids if x+i = 0.
3. Introductory example
To illustrate the approach of the paper, it will be shown now in an essentially
self-contained way that all rents are dissipated in any symmetric equilibrium
8The mixed equilibrium exists under fairly weak conditions. Indeed, by Theorem 5 in
Dasgupta and Maskin (1986), it suffices to ensure that Πi(xi, 0) is lower semi-continuous
at xi = 0, for any i = 1, ..., N , and that
∑N
i=1 Πi(x1, ..., xN ) is upper semi-continuous at
the origin. These conditions often hold in specific examples of contests. See Baye et al.
(1994), Yang (1994), and Alcade and Dahm (2010).
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of the two-player Tullock game with finite R > 2.9 Even for this simple
example, little has been known before about the equilibrium set except that
(i) it does not contain any pure-strategy equilibrium, and (ii) it contains
a mixed equilibrium with complete rent dissipation. Indeed, Konrad and
Kovenock (2009, p. 258) still called the characterization of the equilibrium
for 2 < R <∞ an “open problem.”
Figure 1 depicts player 1’s payoffs as a function of his own bid x1 for
various realizations of player 2’s bid x2.
10 The dashed line corresponds to
player 1’s payoffs when the bids of the two players are of equal size. One can
),( 211 xx
1x

Lx
),( 11
 Hxx

Hx
),( 11
 Lxx
Fig. 1: Player 1’s payoffs as a function of x1, for various realizations of x2
9The restriction to symmetric equilibria is made here solely for expositional reasons. It
will be shown later in the paper that rent dissipation is complete also in any asymmetric
equilibrium.
10The realizations of player 2’s bid are x2 ∈ {0.1, 0.2 = x∗L, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6 = x∗H}.
Further, v = 1 and R = 3.
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see that player 1’s payoffs are strictly upward-sloping in x1 at the respective
intersection points with the dashed line. Thus, a player will either overbid
the competing bid or abstain from bidding altogether.
Consider first a candidate equilibrium in mixed strategies with two bid
realizations x∗H > x
∗
L > 0, used with respective probabilities q
∗
H > 0 and
q∗L = 1 − q∗H > 0. Focus on the lower bid x∗L. In equilibrium, choosing x∗L
must generate a nonnegative expected payoff for player 1, i.e.,
q∗LΠ1(x
∗
L, x
∗
L) + q
∗
HΠ1(x
∗
L, x
∗
H) ≥ 0. (5)
Moreover, the first-order condition for an interior optimum must hold at x∗L,
i.e.,
q∗L
∂Π1(x
∗
L, x
∗
L)
∂x1
+ q∗H
∂Π1(x
∗
L, x
∗
H)
∂x1
= 0. (6)
The crucial point to note is that conditions (5) and (6) are inconsistent.
Intuitively, in Figure 1, player 1’s positive marginal payoff when x2 = x
∗
L
is much larger in absolute terms than the negative marginal payoff when
x2 = x
∗
H . Therefore, choosing q
∗
L = 1 − q∗H so as to satisfy condition (6)
requires q∗L to be quite small, which leads to negative expected payoffs for
player 1, so that (5) fails to hold.11 Thus, there is no symmetric equilibrium
with only two bid levels.
11Formally, a careful calculation shows that for R > 2,
∂Π1(x
∗
L, x
∗
L)
∂x1
=
Rv
4x∗L
− 1 > 1
x∗L
(
v
2
− x∗L) =
1
x∗L
Π1(x
∗
L, x
∗
L), (7)
and similarly,
∂Π1(x
∗
L, x
∗
H)
∂x1
=
R(x∗L)
R−1(x∗H)
R
((x∗H)R + (x
∗
L)
R)2
v − 1 > 1
x∗L
Π1(x
∗
L, x
∗
H). (8)
Taking a weighted average of inequalities (7) and (8), with respective weights q∗L and q
∗
H ,
shows that conditions (5) and (6) are indeed inconsistent.
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The argument given above extends in a straightforward way to candidate
equilibria with more general bid distributions. Regardless of the form of the
distribution, assuming a lowest positive bid, i.e., x1 = x2 > 0, leads to a con-
tradiction. Therefore, x1 = x2 = 0, and any symmetric equilibrium involves
arbitrary small bids. Arbitrarily small bids, however, translate into arbi-
trarily low winning probabilities and hence, into arbitrarily small expected
payoffs. Thus, all rents are dissipated.
4. Formal definition
This section introduces the notion of an elastic contest. The definition is
given first in the symmetric case.
Definition 4.1. A symmetric N-player game with normalized payoffs is
a symmetric elastic contest if for any x0i > 0, there is some constant
λ = λ(x0i ) > 0 such that
∂Πi(x
0
i , x−i)
∂xi
> λΠi(x
0
i , x−i) (9)
holds for any x−i ∈ X−i satisfying xj ≥ x0i for all j 6= i.
The definition requires that, if some given bid of player i is weakly matched by
all competitors, then player i’s marginal payoff strictly exceeds some multiple
of player i’s total payoff. For an assumed lowest equilibrium bid x0i = xi > 0,
integrating condition (9) over all possible vectors of competing bids x−i and
taking account of the participation constraint implies that there will be a
strict incentive for player i to increase her bid. Thus, Definition 4.1 implies
that overbidding or non-participation are the only form of optimal response
in a symmetric equilibrium, which is what is needed in the sequel.
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Here is a generalization of Definition 4.1 to asymmetric settings.
Definition 4.2. An N-player game with normalized payoffs is an elastic
contest if for any two players i, j ∈ {1, ..., N} with i 6= j, the following two
conditions are satisfied:
(L1) For any x0i > 0 and x
0
j > 0 there is, possibly after exchanging i and j,
some constant λ = λ(x0i , x
0
j) > 0 such that
∂Πi(x
0
i , xj, x−i,j)
∂xi
> λΠi(x
0
i , xj, x−i,j) (10)
holds for any xj ≥ x0j and for any x−i,j ∈ X−i,j.
(L2) In condition (L1), the exchange of i and j is not necessary if x0i > 0 is
sufficiently small given x0j > 0.
The somewhat more involved conditions of Definition 4.2 are owned to the
fact that when the contest is asymmetric, then the unraveling of the equilib-
rium does not necessarily evolve on a common scale across players as before.
5. Examples of elastic contests
This section illustrates the scope of Definitions 4.1 and 4.2 using a number
of examples.
5.1. Logit contests
The logit contest has been studied, in particular, by Dixit (1987), Skaperdas
(1996), and Cornes and Hartley (2005). Fix valuations v1 ≥ ... ≥ vN > 0,
and let player i’s payoff be given by
Πi(xi, x−i) = pi(xi, x−i)vi − xi. (11)
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where
pi(xi, x−i) =
hi(xi)
hi(xi) +
∑
j 6=i hj(xj)
, (12)
if the denominator in (12) is positive, and by pi(xi, x−i) = 1N , otherwise.
Here, hi(.) is any continuously differentiable impact function with hi(0) = 0
and h′i(xi) > 0 for xi > 0.
The logit contest is elastic provided that xih
′
i(xi)/hi(xi) > 2 for any
xi ∈ [0, xmaxi ] and for all i = 1, ..., N . This follows directly from Theorem 5.2
below. For example, an asymmetric N -player rent-seeking game with impact
functions hi(xi) = aix
Ri
i , for arbitrary parameters ai > 0, is elastic if Ri > 2
for all i = 1, ..., N .
5.2. Difference-form contests
The difference-form specification is plausible when the probability to win
depends on the difference in investments as, e.g., in warfare. This form of
contest has been studied, in particular, by Hirshleifer (1989) and Baik (1998).
I will focus on the two-player case. Payoffs to player i = 1, 2 are given by
Π̂i(xi, xj) = Fi(xi − xj)vi − xi, (13)
where Fi(z) = 1 − Fj(−z) is the distribution function of the noise term for
player i, assumed to be twice continuously differentiable, and v1 ≥ v2 > 0. In
contrast to the logit specification, a zero bid may win against a positive bid in
a difference-form contest. It is therefore convenient to work with normalized
payoffs
Πi(xi, xj) = (Fi(xi − xj)− Fi(−xj))vi − xi. (14)
The next result gives a simple sufficient condition for a difference-form spec-
ification to define an elastic contest.
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Theorem 5.1. Assume that the density of the noise distribution, fi(z) =
fj(−z), is hump-shaped with mode zero.12 Then, the normalized specification
(14) defines an elastic contest.
For illustration, consider the logistic specification proposed by Hirshleifer
(1989), where player i’s payoffs are given by
Π̂i(xi, xj) =
exp(βxi)
exp(βxi) + exp(βxj)
vi − xi, (15)
with β > 0. This is obviously a special case of (13) with Fi(z) = Fj(z) =
1
1+exp(−βz) . The corresponding density function is easily seen to be hump-
shaped with mode zero. Thus, the payoff-normalized logistic contest is elas-
tic, regardless of the parameter.13
5.3. Contests with additively separable payoffs
In a more general class of examples, player i’s payoff is given by
Πi(xi, x−i) = pi(xi, x−i)Vi(xi, x−i)− Ci(xi, x−i), (16)
where pi(.) is a contest success function, Vi(.) is the value of the prize to
bidder i, which may depend on the vector of bids, and Ci(.) is player i’s
cost function, allowing likewise for externalities. Contests with additively
separable payoffs encompass many cases of interest. E.g., Baye and Hoppe
(2003) consider specification (16) with linear costs. Also the cases of non-
linear costs (Gonza´lez-Dı´az, 2010) and conditional investments (Siegel, 2009;
12I.e., fi(z) is strictly increasing when z ≤ 0, and strictly declining when z ≥ 0.
13If, as in Che and Gale (2000), the noise term is distributed uniformly on an interval
[− 12s ,+ 12s ], where s > 0 is a constant, then the game can be approximated by elastic
contests satisfying the conditions of Theorem 5.1.
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2010) are covered.14
Regarding contest success functions, it will be assumed that pi(.) ≥ 0,
that
∑N
i=1 pi(x1, ..., xN) = 1, and that pi(.) is twice continuously differentiable
at any (xi, x−i) 6= 0. It will also be assumed that pi(.) is monotone, i.e., that
pi(xi, xj, x−i,j) is weakly declining in xj, for any i 6= j, and that a zero bid
never wins against a positive bid, i.e., that pi(xi, x−i) > 0 for x−i 6= 0 implies
xi > 0. Finally, assume pi(xi, x−i) > 0 for any xi > 0. The functions Vi(.)
and Ci(.) are assumed to be twice differentiable. Moreover, Vi(xi, x−i) > 0
and Ci(xi, x−i) > 0 if xi > 0.
There is a simple way to check that a given additively separable contest
is elastic. Define the decisiveness of pi(.) at a bid vector (xi, x−i) with xi > 0
and x−i 6= 0 by
ρi(xi, x−i) =
xi∂pi(xi, x−i)/∂xi
pi(xi, x−i)(1− pi(xi, x−i)) . (18)
Note that ρi is just the elasticity of pi(.)/(1 − pi(.)) with respect to xi. For
example, in the asymmetric Tullock contest, ρi(.) ≡ Ri.15 More generally,
in the logit contest, ρi(.) corresponds to the elasticity of player i’s impact
function. Thus, the decisiveness is a natural extension of existing concepts.
Let ρ denote the joint infimum of the functions ρi(.). Further, denote by
γi(xi, x−i) =
xi∂Ci(xi, x−i)/∂xi
Ci(xi, x−i)
(19)
14In an imperfectly discriminating contest with conditional investments, player i’s pay-
offs are given by
Πi(xi, x−i) = pi(xi, x−i)V
#
i (xi)− (1− pi(xi, x−i))C#i (xi), (17)
where V #i (xi) is player i’s valuation of winning, and C
#
i (xi) is player i’s valuation of losing.
By defining Vi(xi, x−i) = V
#
i (xi) + C
#
i (xi) and Ci(xi, x−i) = C
#
i (xi), specification (17)
clearly becomes a special case of (16).
15The fact that Tullock’s R may be interpreted as an elasticity of the odds of winning
was noted before. See Wang (2010).
13
the own-bid elasticity of player i’s cost function for xi > 0, with joint supre-
mum γ¯. Finally, denote by
αi(xi, x−i) =
xi∂Vi(xi, x−i)/∂xi
Vi(xi, x−i)
(20)
the own-bid elasticity of player i’s valuation for xi > 0, and by α the joint
infimum of the functions αi(.).
The following result offers sufficient conditions for a contest of the form
(16) to be elastic.
Theorem 5.2. A contest with additively separable payoffs is elastic if ρ >
2(γ¯ − α). Moreover, a symmetric contest with additively separable payoffs is
a symmetric elastic contest if ρ > N
N−1(γ¯ − α).
The joint condition on the decisiveness and on the elasticities of valuation and
costs is intuitive. For example, the requirement on the decisiveness becomes
more restrictive as the cost functions become more convex (γ¯ increases), or
the scale economies of the valuation become weaker (α decreases). Thus,
Theorem 5.2 further illustrates the flexibility of Definitions 4.1 and 4.2.
5.4. Risk aversion
Allowing for risk-aversion in imperfectly discriminating contests is certainly
desirable. An overview over existing contributions can be found in Treich
(2010).
Let ui(.) denote player i’s utility function, assumed to be twice contin-
uously differentiable, with u′i(.) > 0 and u
′′
i (.) ≤ 0. For a vector of bids
(xi, x−i), player i’s expected utility is given by
Πi(xi, x−i) = pi(xi, x−i)ui(wi + vi − xi) + (1− pi(xi, x−i))ui(wi − xi), (21)
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where wi denotes player i’s initial wealth, and pi(.) an arbitrary contest suc-
cess function, assumed to satisfy the assumptions of the previous subsection.
Note that payoffs are normalized in this specification provided that ui(wi) = 0
for i = 1, ..., N . For z ∈ R, let
ηi(z) = −
u′′i (z)
u′i(z)
, (22)
denote player i’s Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion, and let η¯
be the joint supremum of the functions ηi(z).
The following result identifies a large class of elastic contests with risk
aversion.
Theorem 5.3. The N-player contest of the form (21) is an elastic contest
after normalization of payoffs if ρ > 2 exp(η¯ v1).
Obviously, the case η¯ = 0 just corresponds to the case of risk-neutrality. How-
ever, the restriction on the elasticity of the contest success function becomes
tighter as the coefficient of absolute risk aversion increases.
6. Equilibrium analysis
This section offers a fairly complete characterization of equilibrium payoffs
for elastic contests. The characterization is obtained by a sequence of two
lemmata.
It is shown first that if some player is always active, then all other players
necessarily use arbitrarily small bids.
Lemma 6.1. Consider an elastic N-player contest. In any mixed equilibrium
(µ∗1, ..., µ
∗
N), if some player i ∈ {1, ..., N} is always active, then all other
players use arbitrarily small bids, i.e., xj = 0 for all j 6= i.
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The intuition here is simply that in an elastic contest, a strictly positive bid
xi > 0 can be rationalized only by an equilibrium belief that assigns positive
probability to bids that are less likely to win than xi > 0. But if xj > 0 for
some player j 6= i, then some bid that is less likely to win, either xi or xj,
cannot be rationalized.
Lemma 6.2. Consider an elastic N-player contest. Then, in any equilibrium
(µ∗1, ..., µ
∗
N), if there is some player i ∈ {1, ..., N} that is always active, then
all other players have zero expected payoffs in equilibrium, i.e., Π∗j = 0 for
all j 6= i.
While the proof of this lemma is somewhat technical, the intuition is straight-
forward. If some player i is always active, then by an immediate application
of Lemma 6.1, necessarily xj = 0 for any j 6= i. However, the optimality of
arbitrarily small bids clearly prohibits any positive rents for players j 6= i, as
a consequence of payoffs being continuous at non-zero bid vectors.
The main result of this section is the following.
Theorem 6.3. Consider an elastic N-player contest. Then, in any equilib-
rium (µ∗1, ..., µ
∗
N), there exists some i ∈ {1, ..., N} such that Π∗j = 0 for all
j 6= i.
Thus, in any elastic contest, there is at most one player that earns a positive
rent. All other rents are competed away in any equilibrium. This type of
result appears in various forms in the literature on perfectly discriminating
contests (see, e.g., Siegel, 2009), but has been less commonly associated with
the theory of imperfectly discriminating contests.
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The section concludes with two corollaries of the analysis above. The first
concerns symmetric equilibria.
Corollary 6.4. In any symmetric equilibrium of a symmetric elastic N-
player contest, there is complete rent dissipation.
For example, in the symmetric Tullock contest with decisiveness parameter
R > N
N−1 , any symmetric equilibrium entails complete rent dissipation.
16
The second corollary concerns pure-strategy equilibria. Here, a pure strat-
egy is simply a strategy whose support set is a singleton. If bidders are re-
stricted to pure strategies, then the use of arbitrarily small positive bids is
not feasible. As a consequence, at most one bidder may be active.
Corollary 6.5. In any pure-strategy equilibrium of an elastic N-player con-
test, there is at most one active player.
This corollary extends related findings by Hirshleifer (1989), Baik (1997),
and Che and Gale (2000).
7. All-pay auction equilibrium
To obtain more specific information about the equilibrium set of elastic con-
tests, it is useful to impose some additional structure.
Unless indicated otherwise, a standard contest will refer in this paper to
a contest with additively separable payoffs, constant valuations, and linear
costs. Thus, without loss of generality, there are valuations v1 ≥ v2 ≥ ... ≥
16As will be shown further below, for R sufficiently large, any equilibrium (i.e., not
necessarily symmetric) of the symmetric N -player Tullock contest entails complete rent
dissipation.
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vN > 0 such that player i’s payoff function is given by
Πi(xi, x−i) = pi(xi, x−i)vi − xi, (23)
where the contest success function pi(.) satisfies the conditions listed in Sec-
tion 5.3. A standard contest is called anonymous if
pi(x1, ..., xN) = pϕ(i)(xϕ(1), ..., xϕ(N)) (24)
for any permutation function ϕ : {1, ..., N} → {1, ..., N}. Obviously, in
an anonymous contest, if x1 = ... = xN , then each player wins with equal
probability 1
N
.17
To characterize the equilibrium set of an elastic anonymous standard
contest, the following definition is useful.
Definition 7.1. An all-pay auction equilibrium is a mixed equilibrium
such that the following three properties hold:
(A1) Player 1 participates with probability one, invests an average amount of
x∗1 =
v2
2
, wins with probability p∗1 = 1− v22v1 , and receives a rent of v∗1 = v1−v2.
(A2) Player 2 participates with probability v2
v1
, invests an average amount of
x∗2 =
(v2)2
2v1
, wins with probability p∗2 =
v2
2v1
, and receives no rent, i.e., v∗2 = 0.
(A3) All other players i = 3, ..., N remain purely passive.
Definition 7.1 defines a class of equilibria in imperfectly discriminating con-
tests that share some important descriptive statistics with the equilibrium in
the corresponding all-pay auction. It is noted here that in applications, these
17The class of contests considered by Alcade and Dahm (2010), which is defined through
conditions in a discrete setting, corresponds roughly to the class of anonymous elastic
standard contests.
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statistics are often sufficient to conduct a more extended economic analysis.
For example, when the contest is the final stage of a dynamic interaction,
then subgame perfection requires only a knowledge of the expected profits
from the contest, whereas detailed information about equilibrium strategies
is not required.
Sufficient conditions on an imperfectly discriminating contest such that
any equilibrium is an all-pay auction equilibrium are provided below. The
case of two players is dealt with first.
Theorem 7.2. Any equilibrium in an anonymous elastic two-player standard
contest is an all-pay auction equilibrium.
Thus, when there are two contestants, a moderate degree of decisiveness
suffices to pin down the equilibrium rents of the players, the probabilities
of participation, average bids, as well as the ex-ante winning probabilities.
In particular, a definite answer is obtained to the question about the extent
of rent dissipation in the two-player Tullock contest with finite decisiveness
parameter R > 2 and potentially heterogeneous valuations.
For more than two players, increasing returns to scale may lead to a
coordination problem among players. That is, there may be several mixed
equilibria, and depending on the equilibrium, the positive equilibrium rent
may go to players other than player 1. In fact, also the size of the equilibrium
rent may depend on the equilibrium.18
Theorem 7.3. For N ≥ 3, there are elastic anonymous standard contests
18Cornes and Hartley (2005) find multiple pure-strategy equilibria in logit contests with
increasing returns. Pure-strategy equilibria, however, are not possible in elastic anonymous
standard contests, as follows from Corollary 6.5 in combination with Theorem 7.2.
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with multiple mixed equilibria in which both the recipient of the rent and the
size of the rent varies with the equilibrium.
The reason for these possibilities is, of course, that the contest is not perfectly
discriminating. For example, even if player 1 bids more then the second-
highest valuation v2 < v1, this does not guarantee that player 1 wins with
a sufficiently high probability to make positive payoffs in expected terms.
Following this intuition, the rather involved proof of Theorem 7.3 boils down
to showing that in an imperfectly discriminating contest, submitting a pos-
itive bid may be suboptimal for a player despite having a valuation strictly
exceeding that of some active player.
The coordination problem captured by Theorem 7.3 disappears, however,
when the contest is sufficiently decisive. To cover the most general conditions
under which the all-pay auction has a unique equilibrium, it will be assumed
that v2 strictly exceeds v3, while a weak inequality is allowed between any
other neighboring pair of valuations.
Theorem 7.4. Consider an anonymous N-player standard contest with val-
uations v1 ≥ v2 > v3 ≥ ... ≥ vN > 0. Then, provided ρ is sufficiently large,
any equilibrium is an all-pay auction equilibrium.
Theorem 7.4 strongly supports the robustness of the all-pay auction. To
obtain the definite prediction of an all-pay equilibrium, the usual assumption
of perfect discrimination can be significantly relaxed. Essential is only that
the contest is standard, anonymous, and sufficiently decisive.19
19The elasticity condition can be dropped here because any sufficiently decisive standard
contest is elastic by Theorem 5.2. The other assumptions of Theorem 7.4 cannot be relaxed
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In the case v1 ≥ v2 = v3 ≥ ... ≥ vN > 0 that is not covered by Theorem
7.4, the all-pay auction allows a continuum of equilibria, which makes the
discussion of robustness more difficult. However, in any equilibrium of the
all-pay auction, all players with valuations strictly lower than v2 remain
purely passive, and a positive rent is feasible only for bidders possessing the
highest valuation v1. These predictions remain true in any equilibrium of a
sufficiently decisive anonymous standard contest. Moreover, under the same
conditions, as ρ grows indefinitely, the profile of rents obtained by bidders
in the imperfectly discriminating contest converges to the profile of rents in
the all-pay auction equilibrium. Thus, the equilibrium equivalence with its
implications for rent dissipation still holds in the limit.
8. Conclusion
This paper has proposed a new approach to characterizing the equilibrium
set of a large class of imperfectly discriminating contests. For contests in
this class, marginal incentives for overbidding are so strong that any posi-
tive bid can be rationalized only by smaller positive bids of all competitors.
As a consequence, any equilibrium entails either arbitrarily small positive
bids or non-participation. In either case, there are immediate and strong
implications for the extent of rent dissipation.
The approach used in the analysis has two obvious advantages. First, in
contrast to existing approaches, statements about the entire equilibrium set
become feasible, which makes the game-theoretic prediction more definitive.
further, however. For example, if the contest is not anonymous, then one player may bid
zero with positive probability even with a common valuation. Thus, the prediction of an
all-pay auction equilibrium would break down.
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The second advantage is the flexibility of the approach. Restrictions re-
garding the functional form of the contest, risk neutrality, and unconditional
investment all turn out to be of secondary importance. For competitive forces
to eliminate rents in a Bertrand fashion, the only essential assumption is that
normalized payoffs are elastic. Overall, this may be seen as a further step
towards a general theory of contests.
Quite specific results could be obtained for elastic anonymous standard
contests. For two players, any equilibrium in such a contest is an all-pay
auction equilibrium. This finding corroborates the intuition that preemption
is a general property also of many imperfectly discriminating contests. The
equivalence extends to three and more players if the contest is, in addition,
sufficiently decisive. Thus, the descriptive statistics of the mixed equilib-
rium in the all-pay auction remains unchanged if the relationship between
effort and output is slightly blurred. Rather than assuming a perfectly dis-
criminating contest, it suffices that the contest is standard, anonymous, and
sufficiently decisive. This clearly offers some support for the robustness of
the all-pay auction.20
The analysis has also settled some long-standing open questions regarding
Tullock’s (1980) rent-seeking game for intermediate values of the decisiveness
parameter (i.e., for finite R > 2).21
20For instance, the “exclusion principle” of Baye et al. (1993), which asserts that it
may be optimal to exclude the player with the highest valuation from an all-pay auction
to increase expected total bids, extends smoothly to the considered class of imperfectly
discriminating contests. This observation is not entirely obvious because, as Fang (2002)
has shown, the exclusion principle does not extend to the lottery contest.
21Further structural properties of the equilibrium bid distribution are derived in a com-
panion paper (2014).
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Appendix. Proofs
Proof of Theorem 5.1. The proof checks the conditions of Definition 4.2
for the difference-form payoff function (13), starting with (L1). Consider bid
levels x0i > 0 and x
0
j > 0. By exchanging the roles of i and j, if necessary,
one may assume without loss of generality that x0i ≤ x0j . Differentiating the
normalized payoff-function,
Πi(xi, xj) = (F (xi − xj)− F (−xj))vi − xi, (25)
with respect to xi yields
∂Πi
∂xi
= f(xi − xj)vi − 1. (26)
Using (25) and (26), inequality (10) becomes
f(x0i − xj)vi − 1 > λ{(F (x0i − xj)− F (−xj))vi − xi}. (27)
Letting λ = 1/x0i , and noting that vi > 0, inequality (27) reduces to
f(x0i − xj)x0i > F (x0i − xj)− F (−xj). (28)
To verify (L1), it suffices to show that inequality (28) holds for any xj ≥ x0j .
Consider some arbitrary xj ≥ x0j . Clearly,
−xj + x0j ≤ −x0j + x0j ≤ 0. (29)
Moreover, since the density fi(.) is hump-shaped with mode zero, fi(z) is
strictly increasing when z ≤ 0. Therefore, since x0i > 0,
f(−xj + x0i )x0i = f(−xj + x0i )
∫ −xj+x0i
−xj
dz (30)
>
∫ −xj+x0i
−xj
f(z)dz (31)
= F (−xj + x0i )− F (−xj). (32)
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This proves (L1). Further, for x0i > 0 sufficiently small given x
0
j > 0, the
exchange of i and j is not necessary to derive x0i ≤ x0j , which verifies condition
(L2). In sum, this proves the theorem. 
Proof of Theorem 5.2. The proof of the first assertion in the statement
of the theorem verifies the two conditions of Definitions 4.2 for additively
separable payoff functions. To check condition (L1), let x0i > 0 and x
0
j > 0.
Using the notation (xi, x−i) = (xi, xj, x−i,j), the payoff function (16) can be
rewritten as
Πi(xi, xj, x−i,j) = pi(xi, xj, x−i,j)Vi(xi, xj, x−i,j)− Ci(xi, xj, x−i,j), (33)
Differentiating (33) with respect to xi yields
∂Πi(xi, xj, x−i,j)
∂xi
=
∂pi(xi, xj, x−i,j)
∂xi
Vi(xi, xj, x−i,j) (34)
+ pi(xi, xj, x−i,j)
∂Vi(xi, xj, x−i,j)
∂xi
− ∂Ci(xi, xj, x−i,j)
∂xi
.
Plugging these expressions into inequality (10), one obtains
∂pi(x
0
i , xj, x−i,j)
∂xi
Vi(x
0
i , xj, x−i,j) + pi(x
0
i , xj, x−i,j)
∂Vi(x
0
i , xj, x−i,j)
∂xi
− ∂Ci(x
0
i , xj, x−i,j)
∂xi
> λ(pi(x
0
i , xj, x−i,j)Vi(x
0
i , xj, x−i,j)− Ci(x0i , xj, x−i,j)). (35)
For
λ =
∂Ci(x
0
i , xj, x−i,j)/∂xi
Ci(x0i , xj, x−i,j)
, (36)
inequality (35) is equivalent to
∂pi(x
0
i , xj, x−i,j)/∂xi
pi(x0i , xj, x−i,j)
+
∂Vi(x
0
i , xj, x−i,j)/∂xi
Vi(x0i , xj, x−i,j)
>
∂Ci(x
0
i , xj, x−i,j)/∂xi
Ci(x0i , xj, x−i,j)
. (37)
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Using the notation introduced before the statement of the theorem, inequality
(37) can be rewritten as
ρi(x
0
i , xj, x−i,j)(1− pi(x0i , xj, x−i,j)) + αi(x0i , xj, x−i,j) > γi(x0i , xj, x−i,j).
(38)
Now, since the contest success function is monotone, and since xj ≥ x0j ,
pi(x
0
i , xj, x−i,j) ≤ pi(x0i , x0j , x−i,j) ≤ pi(x0i , x0j , 0−i,j), (39)
where 0−i,j denotes a vector with N − 2 zero entries. Clearly, either
pi(x
0
i , x
0
j , 0−i,j) ≤
1
2
(40)
or
pj(x
0
j , x
0
i , 0−i,j) = 1− pi(x0i , x0j , 0−i,j) <
1
2
, (41)
so that, possibly after exchanging the roles of i and j,
pi(x
0
i , xj, x−i,j) ≤
1
2
(42)
for any xj ≥ x0j and any x−i,j ∈ X−i,j. Using ρ > 2(γ¯ − α), this shows that
inequality (38) holds for any xj ≥ x0j and any x−i,j ∈ X−i,j, which establishes
condition (L1). As for (L2), note that, since a zero bid never wins against a
positive bid, and since x0j > 0, it must be that pi(0, x
0
j , 0−i,j) = 0. Therefore,
using the continuity of the contest success function at non-zero bid vectors,
inequality (40) holds also if x0i > 0 is made sufficiently small given x
0
j > 0.
This proves also (L2), and therefore, the first assertion in the statement of
the theorem. As for the second assertion, note that in the symmetric case,
by the monotonicity of the contest success function,
pi(x
0
i , x−i) ≤ pi(x0i , x0i , ..., x0i ) =
1
N
(43)
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for any x0i > 0, and for any x−i satisfying xj ≥ x0i for all j 6= i. Therefore,
provided that ρ > N
N−1(γ¯−α), the condition of Definition 4.1 can be verified
just as in the first part of the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 5.3. The proof verifies that the payoff function (21)
satisfies the conditions of Definition 4.2. Dropping the arguments, player i’s
expected utility can be written as
Πi = ui(wi − xi) + pi∆ui, (44)
where
∆ui = ui(wi + vi − xi)− ui(wi − xi) > 0. (45)
Differentiating (44) with respect to xi yields
∂Πi
∂xi
= −u′i(wi − xi) +
∂pi
∂xi
∆ui − pi∆u′i, (46)
where
∆u′i = u
′
i(wi + vi − xi)− u′i(wi − xi) ≤ 0. (47)
To verify conditions (L1) and (L2), consider the inequality
∂Πi(x
0
i , xj, x−i,j)
∂xi
> λΠi(x
0
i , xj, x−i,j). (48)
Plugging (44) and (46) into inequality (48) yields
−u′i(wi − x0i ) +
∂pi
∂xi
∆ui − pi∆u′i > λ(ui(wi − x0i ) + pi∆ui). (49)
Since ui(wi) = 0 and x
0
i > 0, one may choose
λ = λ(x0i ) =
u′i(wi − x0i )
|ui(wi − x0i )|
> 0, (50)
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so that (49) simplifies into
x0i
∂pi/∂xi
pi
− x0i
∆u′i
∆ui
> x0i
u′i(wi − x0i )
|ui(wi − x0i )|
. (51)
Note that the second term on the left-hand side of (51) is positive as a
consequence of weak risk aversion. Therefore, a sufficient condition for (48)
is
x0i
∂pi/∂xi
pi
>
x0iu
′
i(wi − x0i )
|ui(wi − x0i )|
. (52)
Since ui(wi) = 0, and ui(.) is concave, |ui(wi − x0i )| ≥ x0iu′i(wi). Therefore,
the right-hand side of inequality (52) can be bounded from above as follows:
x0iu
′
i(wi − x0i )
|ui(wi − x0i )|
≤ u
′
i(wi − x0i )
u′i(wi)
(53)
= exp(−
∫ wi
wi−x0i
u′′i (z)
u′i(z)
dz) (54)
= exp(
∫ wi
wi−x0i
η(z)dz) (55)
≤ exp(viη¯) (56)
≤ exp(v1η¯) (57)
Thus, using
x0i
∂pi/∂xi
pi
= ρi(x
0
i , xj, x−i,j)(1− pi(x0i , xj, x−i,j)), (58)
a sufficient condition for inequality (48) is
ρi(x
0
i , xj, x−i,j)(1− pi(x0i , xj, x−i,j)) > exp(v1η¯). (59)
In analogy to condition (38) in the proof of Theorem 5.2, condition (59)
ensures now that conditions (L1) and (L2) in Definition 4.2 hold, which
concludes the proof of the theorem. 
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Proof of Lemma 6.1. The proof is by contradiction. Consider a mixed
equilibrium (µ∗1, ..., µ
∗
N), and suppose there are players j 6= i such that
µ∗i ({0}) = 0 and xj > 0. If also xi > 0, then from condition (L1) in Definition
4.2, there exists some λ > 0 such that, possibly after exchanging the roles of
i and j,
∂Πi
∂xi
(xi, xj, x−i,j) > λΠi(xi, xj, x−i,j) (60)
holds for any xj ≥ xj and for any x−i,j ∈ X−i,j. Integrating inequality (60)
over X−i yields∫
∂Πi
∂xi
(xi, x−i) dµ
∗
−i(x−i) > λ
∫
Πi(xi, x−i) dµ
∗
−i(x−i). (61)
Moreover, the lowest bid xi is positive and, hence, optimal. Therefore,∫
Πi(xi, x−i) dµ
∗
−i(x−i) ≥
∫
Πi(0, x−i) dµ∗−i(x−i). (62)
Finally, since payoffs are normalized and xj > 0,∫
Πi(0, x−i) dµ∗−i(x−i) = 0. (63)
Combining (61) through (63), one arrives at∫
∂Πi
∂xi
(xi, x−i) dµ
∗
−i(x−i) > 0, (64)
which contradicts xi ∈ S(µ∗i ). Thus, there cannot be players i 6= j such
that xi > 0 and xj > 0, proving the assertion in this case. If xi = 0 and
µi({0}) = 0 then x+i = 0. Hence, from condition (L2) in Definition 4.2, for
any sufficiently small xi ∈ S(µ∗i )\{0}, there exists some λ > 0 such that
∂Πi
∂xi
(xi, xj, x−i,j) > λΠi(xi, xj, x−i,j) (65)
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holds for any xj ≥ xj and for any x−i,j ∈ X−i,j. The proof now proceeds as
in the first case, with xi replaced by xi. 
Proof of Lemma 6.2. Assume that µ∗i ({0}) = 0, and fix some player j 6= i.
Lemma 6.1 implies that xj = 0. Clearly, Π
∗
j = 0 if player j bids zero with
positive probability. Assume, therefore, that µ∗j({0}) = 0. Then, x+j = 0.
Player j’s expected payoffs from bidding some xj ∈ S(µ∗j) are given by
Π∗j =
∫
X−j
Πj(xj, x−j) dµ∗−j(x−j) (66)
Fix ε > 0. Define the set of bid vectors in which bidder i’s bid weakly exceeds
ε, i.e.,
X−j(ε) = {(xi, x−i,j) ∈ Xi ×X−i,j : xi ≥ ε}, (67)
Player j’s expected payoffs (66) are now decomposed according to whether
bidder i’s bid weakly exceeds ε or not. Thus,
Π∗j =
∫
X−j\X−j(ε)
Πj(xj, x−j) dµ∗−j(x−j)+
∫
X−j(ε)
Πj(xj, x−j) dµ∗−j(x−j). (68)
Since the set function µ∗i is a probability measure, it is continuous from
above. Hence, µ∗i ([0, ε]) becomes arbitrarily small for ε small. In particular,
because payoffs are bounded from above, the first integral in (68) can be made
arbitrarily small by a suitable choice of ε > 0. As for the second integral
in (68), note that X−j(ε) does not contain the origin, so that Πj(xj, x−j) is
continuous on X−j(ε). In particular, for any x−j ∈ X−j(ε),
lim
xj→0
Πj(xj, x−j) = Πj(0, x−j) = 0. (69)
Clearly, X−j(ε) is a bounded and closed set. Therefore, invoking Lebesgue’s
Theorem of Bounded Convergence, limit and integral may be exchanged.
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Thus,
lim
xj→0
∫
X−j(ε)
Πj(xj, x−j) dµ∗−j(x−j) =
∫
X−j(ε)
lim
xj→0
Πj(xj, x−j) dµ∗−j(x−j) = 0.
(70)
Hence, by first choosing ε > 0 sufficiently small, and then some positive
xj ∈ S(µ∗j) sufficiently small, the integral (66) can be made smaller than any
strictly positive bound. Thus, Π∗j = 0, which concludes the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 6.3. If Π∗i = 0 for all players i, then there is nothing
to show. Assume, therefore, that there is some player i with Π∗i > 0. Then,
participation is strictly profitable, so that µ∗i ({0}) = 0. Then, however,
Lemma 6.2 implies that Π∗j = 0 for any j 6= i. This proves the assertion. 
Proof of Corollary 6.4. Immediate from Theorem 6.3. 
Proof of Corollary 6.5. Immediate from Lemma 6.1. 
Proof of Theorem 7.2. Assume first that some player i is always active.
Let j 6= i, and write q = µ∗j({0}). If q = 1, then player i wins with probability
one, and therefore could strictly benefit by shading all his bids, which is
impossible in equilibrium. Therefore, 0 ≤ q < 1. Consider the modified
contest in which player i’s valuation is scaled down to v′i = vi · (1 − q) > 0.
Recall that player j’s mixed strategy µ∗j is a real-valued set function defined
on the collection of Borel subsets of the interval Xj. Therefore, for any Borel
set Yj ⊆ Xj, the probability that player j chooses a nonzero strategy from
the set Yj may be written as µ
∗
j(Yj\{0}). Define now a mixed strategy µ̂j in
the modified contest via
µ̂j(Yj) =
µ∗j(Yj\{0})
1− q (71)
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for any Borel set Yj ⊆ Xj. It is easy to check that (µ∗i , µ̂j) is an equilibrium in
the modified contest. Note that µ̂j does not entail zero bids. Therefore, from
Lemma 6.2, there is full rent dissipation in this equilibrium for both players.
Applying Lemma A.1 to the equilibrium in the modified contest yields that
v′i = vj. Hence, using v
′
i = vi · (1 − q), it follows that µ∗j({0}) = vi−vjvi ,
which implies that i = 1 and j = 2. Moreover, since both players win with
equal probability in the modified contest, player 1 realizes a rent of v1 − v2
in the original contest, as claimed. Thus, any equilibrium with two players is
payoff-equivalent to an all-pay auction equilibrium. If µ∗i ({0}) > 0 for both
players i = 1, 2, then there is full rent dissipation and the argument goes
through as above (for q = 0). The remaining assertions are now immediate.

The following lemma is used in the proof of Theorem 7.2.
Lemma A.1. Consider an anonymous two-player standard contest. If Π∗1 =
Π∗2 = 0, then v1 = v2 and p
∗
1 = p
∗
2 =
1
2
.
Proof. Assume that
p∗1v1 − x∗1 = 0, (72)
p∗2v2 − x∗2 = 0, (73)
where p∗i is player i’s ex-ante expected probability of winning, and x
∗
i is player
i’s ex-ante expected bid. Suppose now that player 2 considers copying player
1’s strategy µ∗1. Since expected payoffs are zero for player 2 in equilibrium, a
deviation to µ∗1 would necessarily yield weakly negative expected payoffs for
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player 2, i.e.,
1
2
v2 − x∗1 ≤ 0, (74)
where the winning probability of 1
2
follows from anonymity. Similarly,
1
2
v1 − x∗2 ≤ 0. (75)
It is now easy to see that (72-75) imply
p∗2v2 ≥
1
2
v1, (76)
p∗1v1 ≥
1
2
v2. (77)
Adding up yields
p∗1v1 + p
∗
2v2 ≥
v1 + v2
2
. (78)
Suppose v1 > v2. Then p
∗
2 ≤ 12 . But from v1 > v2, and (76), p∗2 > 12 , which is
a contradiction. Similarly, v1 < v2 leads to a contradiction. Hence, v1 = v2.
In particular, (78) is an equality, so each of (76) and (77) must be equalities.
Thus, also p∗1 = p
∗
2 =
1
2
. 
Proof of Theorem 7.3. Consider a three-player Tullock contest with de-
cisiveness parameter R > 2 and valuations v1 > v2 > v3 > 0. Alcade and
Dahm (2010) have constructed an all-pay auction equilibrium in which player
1 earns a positive rent. To prove the first claim in the statement of the theo-
rem, it will be shown now that, provided v1, v2, and v3 are sufficiently close to
each other, there exist another equilibrium in which player 2 earns a positive
rent. For this, take an all-pay auction equilibrium (µ∗2, µ
∗
3) in the two-player
contest between players 2 and 3. It suffices to verify that player 1’s expected
32
payoff from entering with some positive bid x1 > 0 is negative. If matched
in a two-player contest against µ∗2, the bid x1 wins with probability
p12 =
∫
xR1
xR1 + x
R
2
dµ∗2(x2) > 0. (79)
Denote player 1’s rent from playing x1 against µ
∗
2 in the two-player contest
by Π∗12 = p12v1 − x1. I claim that
Π∗12 ≤ p12 · (v1 − v3), (80)
where the right-hand side of (80) corresponds intuitively to player 1’s excess
rent, compared to player 3 in the same situation. Suppose inequality (80)
does not hold. Then, in the two-player contest between 2 and 3, player 3
could submit a bid equal to x1 (instead of playing µ
∗
3), and thereby realize a
rent of
p12v3 − x1 = p12v1 − x1 − p12 · (v1 − v3) > 0. (81)
This, however, contradicts the fact that player 3’s rent is completely dissi-
pated in the two-player all-pay auction equilibrium (µ∗2, µ
∗
3). Thus, inequality
(80) indeed holds. Note next that player 1’s rent from bidding x1 against µ
∗
2
is diminished if player 3’s bidding is taken into account. Specifically, in the
all-pay auction equilibrium (µ∗2, µ
∗
3), player 3 exerts an average effort of∫
x3 dµ
∗
3(x3) =
v23
2v2
. (82)
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Hence, on average, player 1’s probability of winning is lowered by∫
(
xR1
xR1 + x
R
2
− x
R
1
xR1 + x
R
2 + x
R
3
) d(µ∗2(x2)× µ∗3(x3))
=
∫
xR1
xR1 + x
R
2
(1− x
R
1 + x
R
2
xR1 + x
R
2 + x
R
3
) d(µ∗2(x2)× µ∗3(x3)) (83)
=
∫
xR1
xR1 + x
R
2
{∫
xR3
xR1 + x
R
2 + x
R
3
dµ∗3(x3)
}
dµ∗2(x2) (84)
≥ 1
3vR1
·
∫
xR1
xR1 + x
R
2
dµ∗2(x2) ·
∫
xR3 dµ
∗
3(x3) (85)
≥ 1
3vR1
· p12 · (
∫
x3 dµ
∗
3(x3))
R (86)
=
1
3vR1
· p12 · ( v
2
3
2v2
)R, (87)
where Jensen’s inequality has been used. Therefore, player 1’s rent from
bidding x1 in the three-player contest against µ
∗
2 and µ
∗
3 is∫
(
xR1
xR1 + x
R
2 + x
R
3
− x1) d(µ∗2(x2)× µ∗3(x3))
≤ p12 · {v1 − v3 − 1
3vR1
(
v23
2v2
)Rv1}. (88)
Assume now that players’ valuations are very close to each other, so that
v3
v1
≥ (1− 1
2R+3
)1/2R. (89)
Then, since R > 2,
v3
v1
> 1− 1
2R+3
, (90)
so that
v1 − v3 < v1
2R+3
. (91)
On the other hand,
1
3vR1
(
v23
2v2
)R >
1
2R+2
(
v23
v21
)R ≥ 1
2R+2
(1− 2−(R+3)) > 1
2R+3
. (92)
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Combining (91) and (92) shows that, if (89) holds, the right-hand side of
inequality (88) is negative, which proves the first claim in the statement of the
theorem. To prove the second claim, consider an all-pay auction equilibrium
in the two-player contest between players 1 and 3, and note that, as above,
player 2 has no incentive to submit a positive bid if the three valuations are
sufficiently close to each other. Then, player 1 earns a rent of v1−v3 6= v1−v2.
Thus, player 1’s rent may depend on the equilibrium. This proves the second
claim, and thereby the theorem. 
Proof of Theorem 7.4. The proof is by contradiction. Let i ∈ {1, 2}, and
suppose that some player j ∈ {3, ..., N} is active. Then, the highest bid used
by player j is positive, i.e., x¯j > 0. By the anonymity and monotonicity of
the contest success function,
pi(x¯j, 0, x−i,j) = pj(x¯j, 0, x−i,j) ≥ pj(x¯j, xi, x−i,j), (93)
for any xi ∈ Xi and any x−i,j ∈ X−i,j. Moreover, since x¯j is optimal, and a
zero bid always guarantees a weakly positive payoff,∫
pj(x¯j, xi, x−i,j) d(µ∗i (xi)× µ∗−i,j(x−i,j)) vj − x¯j ≥ 0. (94)
Combining (93) and (94), and subsequently integrating xi out, yields∫
pi(x¯j, 0, x−i,j) dµ∗−i,j(x−i,j) vj − x¯j ≥ 0. (95)
By assumption, vi ≥ v2 > v3 ≥ vj. Therefore,
κ ≡
√
vi
vj
> 1. (96)
Hence, vj = vi/κ
2 and therefore∫
pi(x¯j, 0, x−i,j)
κ
dµ∗−i,j(x−i,j) vi − κx¯j ≥ 0. (97)
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By Lemmata A.2 and A.3, provided that ρ is sufficiently large,
pi(x¯j, 0, x−i,j)
κ
≤ 2
κ
pi(x¯j, x¯j, x−i,j) < pi(κx¯j, x¯j, x−i,j) (98)
for any x−i,j ∈ X−i,j. Combining (97) and (98), one finds∫
pi(κx¯j, x¯j, x−i,j) dµ∗−i,j(x−i,j) vi − κx¯j > 0. (99)
By the monotonicity of the contest success function,
pi(κx¯j, x¯j, x−i,j) ≤ pi(κx¯j, xj, x−i,j) (100)
for any xj ∈ S(µ∗j) and any x−i,j ∈ X−i,j. Hence, combining the last two
inequalities, and subsequently integrating over Xj, yields∫
pi(κx¯j, xj, x−i,j) d(µ∗j(xj)× µ∗−i,j(x−i,j)) vi − κx¯j > 0. (101)
I.e., player i receives positive payoffs from unilaterally playing xi = κx¯j with
certainty. It follows that both players, 1 and 2, earn positive rents. But this
is impossible in view of Theorem 6.3. Hence, players j = 3, ..., N are indeed
all purely passive. The assertion now follows from Theorem 7.2. 
The following two lemmata are used in the proof of Theorem 7.4.
Lemma A.2. Fix κ > 1. Then, for any sufficiently large ρ,
pi(κx¯j, x¯j, x−i,j) >
2
κ
pi(x¯j, x¯j, x−i,j) (102)
for any x−i,j ∈ X−i,j.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that
pi(κx¯j, x¯j, x−i,j) ≤ 2
κ
pi(x¯j, x¯j, x−i,j) (103)
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for some x−i,j ∈ X−i,j. Then, since anonymity implies pi(x¯j, x¯j, x−i,j) ≤ 12 ,
necessarily
pi(κx¯j, x¯j, x−i,j) ≤ 1
κ
. (104)
By monotonicity,
pi(κ˜x¯j, x¯j, x−i,j) ≤ 1
κ˜
(105)
for any κ˜ ∈ [1, κ]. As a consequence, the own-bid elasticity of the contest
success function satisfies
τ i(κ˜x¯j, x¯j, x−i,j) ≡ (1− pi(κ˜x¯j, x¯j, x−i,j))ρi(κ˜x¯j, x¯j, x−i,j) (106)
≥ (1− 1
κ˜
) ρ (107)
for any κ˜ ∈ [1, κ]. Hence,
pi(κx¯j, x¯j, x−i,j)
pi(x¯j, x¯j, x−i,j)
= exp
∫ κ
1
τ i(κ˜x¯j, x¯j, x−i,j)dκ˜ (108)
≥ exp{(κ− 1− lnκ) ρ} (109)
But κ− 1− lnκ > 0. Hence, for ρ sufficiently large,
pi(κx¯j, x¯j, x−i,j) >
2
κ
pi(x¯j, x¯j, x−i,j), (110)
which contradicts (103). Hence, the assertion holds. 
Lemma A.3. In any standard contest, pi(xi, 0, x−i,j) ≤ 2pi(xi, xi, x−i,j)
holds for any xi ≥ 0 and any x−i,j ≥ 0.
Proof. Clearly, from anonymity,
pi(xi, xi, x−i,j) = 1− pj(xi, xi, x−i,j)−
∑
k 6=i,j
pk(xk, xj, x−j,k) (111)
= 1− pi(xi, xi, x−i,j)−
∑
k 6=i,j
pk(xk, xj, x−j,k). (112)
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Hence, by monotonicity, and because the contest is standard,
2pi(xi, xi, x−i,j) = 1−
∑
k 6=i,j
pk(xk, xj, x−j,k) (113)
≥ 1−
∑
k 6=i,j
pk(xk, 0, x−j,k) (114)
= 1− pj(0, xi, x−i,j)−
∑
k 6=i,j
pk(xk, 0, x−j,k) (115)
= pi(xi, 0, x−i,j), (116)
which proves the assertion. 
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